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Prisoner Voting and the UK’s Imprisoned European Policy 
 








Following this month’s EU court ruling on voting rights for prisoners, Piet Eeckhout 
situates the judgement in context and assesses its consequences for the UK. In so 
doing, he explores the relationship between EU law and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, suggesting that, even when states attempt to avoid difficult 
ECHR rulings, they may encounter them again through EU law with significantly less 
room to manoeuvre. 
 
Recently, the EU Court of Justice delivered a judgement on prisoner voting. In the 
UK, the prisoner voting saga is well known. UK legislation bans all convicted 
prisoners from voting in general, European and municipal elections. There is no 
minimum threshold, other than serving a prison sentence, and the voting ban is 
lifted upon leaving prison. It is an automatic effect of being convicted, not an 
individually tailored punishment for certain types of criminal behaviour. 
 
Ten years ago, the European Court of Human Rights decided in the Hirst case that 
this generalised, automatic voting ban is a breach of the fundamental right to 
participate in free elections, as articulated in Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The Court found that, although there is great variation throughout Europe in the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners, the UK ban was too general and indiscriminate to 
pass muster. The Court generally recognises that states have a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ to determine limits to fundamental rights, but in Hirst, and in cases 
which followed, it found that the UK’s legislation was outside any acceptable 
margin. 
 
This Strasbourg case law has become a preferred target for the Strasbourg-sceptics 
in UK politics and public debate, who see it as a prime example of the European 
Court of Human Rights extending the Convention far beyond what was originally 
intended, and meddling in issues which are best left to national democratic politics. 
 
The UK government and parliament have been dragging their feet when it comes to 
implementing these Strasbourg judgements. Prime Minister David Cameron has 
himself said that the idea of prisoners voting makes him physically sick. 
 
The UK courts are not, on their own, in a position to accommodate prisoners’ voting 
rights under the Convention. The Human Rights Act, which implements the 
Convention in national law, does not allow them to override parliamentary 
legislation. Nevertheless, the UK Supreme Court has accepted the Strasbourg case 
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law in Chester and McGeoch. The justices are clearly not as outraged as the Prime 
Minister and many in the Conservative Party. 
 
Of course, the UK could free itself from this unwelcome Strasbourg interference by 
simply withdrawing from the Convention. Before last May’s general election, it 
often looked like a Conservative government would try to do just that. Now, 
however, it is less clear whether any radical reform of human rights policies is on 
the cards. 
 
Be that as it may, there is now another European court which has put its foot in the 
door. Earlier this month, the EU Court of Justice decided in Delvigne to follow in the 
footsteps of the Strasbourg case law when it comes to voting bans for European 
Parliament elections. The case involved a French convict, but the principles which 
the Court established extend to all EP elections, including those in the UK. 
 
The lesson is that, even if you manage to keep the Convention out of your front 
door, it will creep in through the backdoor of EU law. Why is this the case? To start, 
the EU has its own binding Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). In short, the 
Charter is a copy of the European Convention with a number of add-ons (such as a 
range of social and economic rights). 
 
There is however an important difference with the Convention. Unlike the 
Convention, the EU Charter is not generally binding on the EU Member States. 
Instead, it only binds them when they implement EU law (Article 51(1) CFR). That is 
a crucial limitation, and one whose application is not straightforward. Ultimately, it 
is for the EU Court of Justice to determine in which instances the Charter applies. 
 
The Delvigne decision is a prime example of the indeterminacy of the 
‘implementation’ requirement in EU law. The Charter contains a provision on EP 
elections, but it only states the principle that MEPs ‘shall be elected by direct 
universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot’. There is no uniform EU-wide 
procedure for elections to the EP, and a 1976 Act (part of the EU’s treaty norms) 
does no more than leave the question of the franchise to national law, whilst at the 
same time confirming the requirement of direct universal suffrage. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice decided that, in determining the franchise, the EU 
Member States must respect the Charter. In effect, it has interpreted the Charter 
requirements in accordance with the Strasbourg case law – even if it did not 
expressly refer to that case law. 
 
For UK purposes, the crucial point in Delvigne is that the Court of Justice said that 
there must be a degree of proportionality between the seriousness of the crime or 
its punishment and a prisoner’s disenfranchisement. Clearly this means that the 
general, automatic and indiscriminate disenfranchisement of all prisoners does not 
comply with the EU Charter. For EP elections, some convicted prisoners can be 
disenfranchised, but not all of them. 
 
There are now two bail-out cards for UK prisoners seeking to vote. At least in 
principle, the EU card is a trump. The fact that UK legislation does not provide for 
this EU requirement is not an issue, unlike the Convention and the Human Rights 
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Act mentioned before. Under the doctrine of primacy, EU law prevails over any 
inconsistent national law. All UK courts are under an obligation to ensure that any 
rights under EU law are respected. 
 
It will be interesting to see how this issue plays out. The Court of Justice judgement 
definitely puts further pressure on the UK to amend its prisoner voting ban. 
Nevertheless, the prisoner voting saga is but a proxy for a much wider point. 
 
For EU Member States, adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights is 
next to indissociable from their EU membership. The EU is founded on a set of 
values which include human rights. The EU Charter must be respected within the 
scope of EU law. If an EU Member State were to leave the European Convention, it 
would continue to be bound by the Convention indirectly through EU law. 
 
Such circumstances would lead to very awkward legal distinctions. For example, that 
state's citizens would not have certain rights (because their case would not be 
covered by EU law), but migrant workers from other EU Member States would have 
those rights by virtue of the Charter and of being within the scope of application of 
EU law. It would result in a paradoxical situation in which EU citizens living in that 
country would have greater human rights entitlements than its own citizens! 
 
The result is that the UK government’s European policy is constrained – imprisoned 
even. On one side, the European Convention and EU membership cannot be easily 
separated. On the other, European judgements – be they delivered in Strasbourg or 
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